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RECENT CASES
The minority in the instant case contended 28 U.S.C. §
1821 (1958) provides only that a witness shall recover his full
statutory fees and has no relationship to the eventual recovery
of fees as costs by the prevailing party In addition, the
minority noted that an Admiralty rule,'1 5 formulated by the
Supreme Court, explicitly espouses the 100-mile limitation on
taxation of costs, and the majority decision creates a different
rule for costs in civil cases from that in Admiralty 16
Under English practice, costs have included essentially
all reasonable items of expense, at times greatly exceeding
the actual sum in dispute.1 7  Though t h e English system
purportedly tends to discourage unfounded litigation,", pro-
ponents of American practice claim the English system also
tends to deter justice by creating fear of being saddled with
an opponent's legal expenses.1 9
If the purpose of the 100-mile rule is to protect
impecunious litigants, it may, on occasion, have considerable
merit. In the instant case, it would have protected an
individual from bearing the costs of a wealthy corporation
that could better have borne them. On the other hand, where
a party with limited means must bring witnesses from great
distance, the rule prevents him from having costs taxed
against a losing litigant that might better afford the expense.
If the discretion of the courts can in reality provide a safe-
guard against unreasonable costs being taxed, there seems
to be adequate basis for rejection of the 100-mile rule.
ROBERT WHEELER
SALES-CONDITIONAL SALES-RECOVERY OF DEFICIENCY-
Defendant purchased a combine from the plaintiff under a
1959) Maresco v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 167 F Supp. 845 (E.D.N.Y.
1958) Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15. ADMIRALTY RULE 47, 28 U.S.C. (1958), states. "Traveling expenses of
any witness for more than one hundred miles to and from the court or place of
taking the testimony shall not be taxed as costs."
16. Supra note 10.
17. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YAIz L.J. 849, 850 (1929), MooRE, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 1302.
18. See Goodhart, supra note 17, at 872.
19. See Moore, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1304.
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conditional sales contract which provided that in the event
the vendee failed to comply with the contract, the vendor
could recover the deficiency after the sale. Defendant
defaulted in his payments and the plaintiff brought an action
to foreclose his lien and for the deficiency which resulted
after the sale. In reversing the District Court, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota held that the foreclosure by action and
the judicial sale did not amount to an election to repossess
by the vendor, and, therefore, did not defeat his right to
recover the deficiency Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v Pfeiffle,
124 N.W.2d 369 (N.D 1963)
At common law the conditional vendor was required to
elect his remedies; he could sue on the debt or he could
repossess his security, but he could not do both.' If he sued
on the debt, it was said that he waived his reserved title.2
Thus, the conditional vendor lost his security and became
a general creditor If the conditional vendor elected to take
possession of the goods, the contract was treated as rescinded
and he lost any claim for the deficiency 3 This requirement
of election on the part of the vendor, even where the contract
provided otherwise, was due largely to the fact that the
vendee, who had paid a part of the purchase price, should
be entitled to an interest in the goods, which he should not
forfeit by mere default in a subsequent payment.
Since the conditional vendee had no equity of redemp-
tion 4 the unscrupulous vendor might repossess with only
the final payment being in default. In view of the possible
hardship, legislatures in most states have provided remedies
for the conditional vendee. 5 North Dakota has provided that
the conditional vendee may, in the court's discretion, be
entitled to a reasonable time in which to make his default
good after the conditional vendor has brought an action to
1. See, e.g., Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal. 353, 42 Pac. 435 (1895)
Russell v. Martin, 232 Mass. 379, 122 N.E. 447 (1919) Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v.
Mahon, 13 N.D. 516, 101 N.W 903 (1904).
2. E.g., George J. Birkel Co. v. Nast, 20 Cal. App. 651, 129 Pac. 945 (1912)
Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Service Coal Co., 264 Mich. 298, 249 N.W 852
(1933) Alden v. W J. Dyer & Bro., 92 Minn. 134, 99 N.W 784 (1904).
3. E.g., Martin Music Co. v. Robb, 115 Cal. App. 414, 1 P.2d 1000 (1931)
McBryan v. Universal Elev. Co., 130 Mich. 111, 89 N.W 683 (1902) Perkins v.
Grobben, 116 Mich. 178, 74 N.W 469 (1898).
4. See Bingham v. Vandegrift, 93 Ala. 283, 9 So. 280 (1890) Hughes v.
Harlam. 166 N.Y. 427, 60 N.E. 22 (1901).
5. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 511.19 (1947) S.D. CODE § 54.02 (1939) and
all states which have adopted the U.C.C. §§ 9-504, 505, 506 (1962).
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foreclose.6  He is entitled to notice and redemption where
the conditional vendor has retaken the property without legal
process.7 Finally, it is provided that where the conditional
vendee has a legal counterclaim, the judge of the district
court may enjoin the conditional vendor from foreclosing
by advertisement or from taking possession of or selling the
property, and direct that further proceedings be had in the
district court having jurisdictionAs These "relief from hard-
ship" statutes give to the conditional vendee remedies not
possessed at early law and enlarge the conditional vendor's
remedies, i.e. " a statutory right to seek relief by fore-
closure in a court of equity -9
In holding that a conditional sales contract may be fore-
closed and, where the contract so provides, a deficiency
judgment is allowed, the majority of the courts reason that
the intention cf the parties should be carried out, i.e. receipt
of the goods by the vendee and receipt of the contract price
by the vendor 10 Some courts, however, have allowed a
deficiency recovery on the basis that the agreement was a
chattel mortgage, where it actually appeared to be a con-
ditional sales contract.1 Minnesota allows a recovery for a
deficiency, 1 2 but it is denied when the contract is not fore-
closed by the appropriate action.13
To recover a deficiency in North Dakota, the contract
must expressly provide for the deficiency and must be
foreclosed 4 by one of the following methods: (1) take
possession of the property, give written notice to the vendee
stating the amount due and allow the statutory period for
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-07 (1961).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-07.1 (1961). See Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co.,
107 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1961).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-08 (1961). But see McLean v. Underdal, 73 N.D.
74, 11 N.W.2d 102 (1943) This statute does not give the vendee an absolute
right of redemption, and does not apply to a, purchaser of property from the
vendor after repossession.
9. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Pfeiffle, 124 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1963).
10. See, E.g., Matteson v. Equitable Min. & Mill. Co., 143 Cal. 436, 77 Pac.
144 (1904) Wisconsin Chair Co. v. Bluechel, 216 Iowa 717, 246 N.W 817 (1933),
National Cash Register Co. v. Ness, 204 Minn. 148, 282 N.W 829 (1938).
11. D. M. Osborne & Co. v, Connor, 4 Kan. App. 609, 46 Pac. 327 (1896) C.
Aultman & Co. v. Silha, 85 Wis. 359, 55 N.W 711 (1893). the transaction
was an absolute sale with a mortgage back."
12. National Cash Register Co. v. Ness, 204 Minn. 148, 282 N.W 829 (1938).
13. See Yellow Mfg. Accept. Corp. v. Handier, 249 Minn. 539, 83 N.W.2d 103
(1957) Ahlers v. Jones, 193 Minn. 544, 259 N.W 397 (1935).
14. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Pfeiffle, supra note 9, at 375.
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-07.1 (1961).
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redemption; 15 (2) foreclosure by action; 16 or (3) foreclosure
by advertisement. 7 Since the conditional sales contract has
the "elements of a lien", the procedure in foreclosure is
governed by Chapter 32-20 of the North Dakota Century
Code.' s
The writer is of the opinion that the result in the principal
case is sound. However, the decision is somewhat limited
in that, in order to recover a deficiency, the contract must
expressly provide for it. Under certain circumstances, deny-
ing the conditional vendor the deficiency because it was not
expressly provided for in the contract would lead to inequita-
ble results. It is difficult to see why an express promise to
pay the deficiency should have any more effect than an
express promise to pay the purchase price.
LYNN HOGHAUG
CONFLICT OF LAWS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-INTERSPOUSAL
IMMUNITY DETERMINED ACCORDING TO LAW OF DOMICILE-
The plaintiff brought an action against her husband alleging
his negligence caused a motor vehicle accident in Massachu-
setts. Both parties were domiciled in New Hampshire where
a wife could maintain such an action against her husband.
Under Massachusetts law she could not. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire held that the law of the domicile of the
parties determined whether the husband was immune from
liability to his wife. Thompson v Thompson, 193 A.2d 439
(N.H. 1963)
Interspousal immunity from suit is a common law
doctrine which developed because of the unity concept of
husband and wife.' Although Married Women's Acts have
virtually abrogated that concept, 2 many states still prohibit
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-07 (1961).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-08 (1961).
18. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Pfeiffle, supra note 9, at 375.
1. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 66 (1962) Rains v. Rains, 46
P.2d 740, 741 (Colo. 1935) Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772, 773(1962). See generally PRossER, TORTS 671 (2d ed. 1955).
2. See Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95, 96 (Alaska 1963), Brown v. Gosser,
262 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953) Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242
N.W 626, 529 (1932). See generally PRossm, TORTS 672 (2d ed. 1955).
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